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Findings
- Go to finding 1A large portion of borrowers eligible for IDR are not enrolled, and these un-enrolled borrowers have significantly lower incomes than other borrowers.
- Go to finding 2有资格获得IDR但没有注册的借款人似乎可以跟上他们的学生贷款支付,但使用他们收入的很大一部分来这样做. Enrolling in IDR could decrease their short-term payment burden substantially.
- Go to finding 3Of borrowers eligible for IDR but not enrolled, most would receive debt forgiveness under IDR. But those with relatively higher incomes receive no forgiveness and IDR is equivalent to a loan extension, lowering their monthly payments but increasing the total cost of their debt.
- Go to finding 4Changes to IDR may dramatically expand eligibility and reduce total out of pocket cost to current IDR enrollees.
- Go to finding 5Implications
In March 2020, the federal government paused payments on all $1.5万亿美元的联邦学生贷款尚未偿还,以便在2019冠状病毒病大流行期间为借款人提供经济救济.1 Federal student loans now total $1.6 trillion spread across 43 million borrowers. With the prospect of student loan forbearance ending and payments on this debt resuming, policymakers and student debt groups have put forward various proposals to further help struggling borrowers. 这些建议包括通过彻底免除债务来减轻现有借款人的支付负担2 or changes to programs such as income driven repayment (IDR).3 Other reforms aim to make higher education more affordable and thus limit future borrowing4 这些提议的最终目标是减轻学生债务的经济负担:对一些借款人来说,月供可能构成实得收入的很大一部分,而背负如此巨额的债务可能会成为更健康的财务状况的障碍, (see, e.g., Farrell, Greig, and Sullivan 2020).
IDR是针对某些借款人的还款减免计划的集合,可以降低他们的月供,并可能提供贷款减免. Under IDR, monthly payments are capped based on the borrower’s income, and if the borrower completes a certain number of IDR payments, any remaining loan balance is forgiven. While conceptually straightforward, the IDR programs have been criticized for a number of reasons, most of which argue that these programs do not provide sufficient relief to struggling borrowers.5
Expanding relief through IDR could take many forms. It could be as simple as getting more currently eligible borrowers enrolled by reducing paperwork burdens, increasing awareness of the program, or even automatically enrolling all borrowers in IDR. Policymakers could also change the underlying parameters of IDR to lower monthly payments, decrease the amount of time borrowers spend in repayment, and increase the number of borrowers who are eligible for IDR.
However, 缺乏关于目前有资格获得IDR但未注册的借款人的信息-他们的付款水平, their incomes, 他们更广泛的经济状况——这些信息对于设计救援计划和预测其效果是必要的. Specifically, how many are not enrolled because of obstacles to enrollment versus choosing not to enroll? How do their finances differ from other borrowers? Data on these borrowers is limited, especially data on borrowers’ current incomes, which is a primary criterion for IDR eligibility. 如果没有这些数据,就不可能知道有多少人可能有资格参加目前的IDR计划,或者有多少人有资格参加扩大或修订的IDR计划.
In this paper, we use administrative banking and credit bureau data to shed light on this group of borrowers. These data cover 117,000 borrowers and include measures of income, monthly scheduled payments, and actual payments made and thus provide a uniquely detailed window into the finances of student debt borrowers. Our finding are as follows:
- A large portion of borrowers eligible for IDR are not enrolled, and these un-enrolled borrowers have significantly lower incomes than other borrowers.
- 有资格获得IDR但没有注册的借款人似乎可以跟上他们的学生贷款支付,但使用他们收入的很大一部分来这样做. Enrolling in IDR could decrease their short-term payment burden substantially.
- Of borrowers eligible for IDR but not enrolled, most would receive debt forgiveness under IDR. But those with relatively higher incomes receive no forgiveness and IDR is equivalent to a loan extension, lowering their monthly payments but increasing the total cost of their debt.
- Changes to IDR may dramatically expand eligibility and reduce total out of pocket cost to current IDR enrollees.
These findings have several implications for the design of policies to relieve student debt. First and foremost, the IDR programs are complex and can have counterintuitive effects on borrowers’ finances. 降低月供可以延长借款人还款的时间,并将债务记录在信用报告上, potentially increasing the amount of interest they pay as well as increasing the cost of other debt. For some borrowers this is a worthwhile tradeoff, and for others it is not.
In our data, we see many borrowers eligible for IDR but not enrolled who could see substantial monthly savings. This suggests that making IDR participation easier by, for example, reducing initial and recurring paperwork, could be highly beneficial. Nevertheless, 许多其他符合IDR条件的借款人可获得的净收益不太明显,避免IDR可能是这些借款人财务状况的最佳选择.
Together, 这意味着,任何自动将借款人纳入IDR计划的举措都应该伴随着有关降低月供和其他帮助借款人的援助的权衡的信息.
Background
收入驱动还款(IDR)是由教育部提供的一系列项目,允许借款人在学生债务与收入之比较高时降低每月的学生债务偿还额,并在按IDR计划按时全额偿还一定数量的月供后,有可能获得债务减免.
每个IDR计划都是一个通用模板的变体:而不是按照标准的10年摊销时间表付款, a new monthly payment is calculated based on the borrower’s income. Specifically, the new payment is calculated as a fraction of their discretionary income, usually 10 percent.6 这里的可自由支配收入是指借款人在纳税申报表中调整后的总收入减去联邦贫困线的150%.7
If the IDR amount is lower than their current payment, the borrower makes payments at this lower amount for one year. Each year, borrowers must recertify their eligibility and income, and their payment amount is re-calculated. 这一年度程序一直持续到借款人还清债务或按印尼盾计息额支付最高限额以获得豁免为止, 8 typically after 20 years for undergraduate debt.9 Once the borrower makes the required number of payments under IDR, the remaining balance on their loan is forgiven.
This means that IDR provides relief in two different ways: lower payments now and forgiveness in the future. But to receive forgiveness, the borrower must participate in IDR for 20 years, even if their monthly payment amount is $0. Furthermore, people on IDR may end up paying a considerable amount of money toward their debt, even if their monthly payments only just cover their monthly interest. Ultimately, whether IDR benefits any individual borrower depends on that borrower’s financial situation, their personal preferences for carrying debt, and their financial plans for the future.
要确定目前未加入IDR的借款人是否会从加入IDR中受益,需要有关借款人余额和收入的丰富数据, which the JPMC Institute is uniquely positioned to provide.
Finding One: A large portion of borrowers eligible for IDR are not enrolled, and these un-enrolled borrowers have significantly lower incomes than other borrowers.
How many people are not enrolled in IDR programs but could be? Figure 1 shows that 9 percent of our sample are on IDR. The other 91 percent are not enrolled in IDR, including 69 percent of borrowers who are not eligible for IDR given their loan balance and income levels, and 22 percent of borrowers who would be eligible for IDR but are not enrolled. This suggests that for every borrower on IDR there are potentially two more who are eligible but not enrolled.
Figure 1: For every person on IDR, there are roughly two people who could be in IDR
回想一下,如果借款人的收入相对于其初始余额(借款人所承担的原始债务金额)较低,那么借款人就有资格获得IDR. Figure 2 shows the distribution of opening balances for each of our three groups. While IDR borrowers have slightly higher opening balances, the distributions for all three groups are comparable. If original loan amounts for each group are similar, that suggests that differences in IDR eligibility must be driven by differences in income. When we look at the distribution of income within each group, we find that is the case.
Figure 2: Borrowers eligible for IDR but not enrolled have similar balances to non-eligible borrowers
Figure 3 shows the distribution of income within each of our groups. Given their similar balances, borrowers enrolled in IDR tend to have lower incomes than those not eligible for IDR. This mechanically must be true given the eligibility criteria for IDR. However, 有资格申请印尼卢比但未登记的借款人的收入甚至比目前的印尼卢比参与者低得多. Part of this is mechanical—for a fixed amount of debt, 低收入借款人更有可能符合条件,但IDR参保者的原始余额仅略高于未参保者的余额. This suggests that IDR enrollment rates are higher among high-income borrowers.
Figure 3: Borrowers eligible for IDR have significantly lower incomes
这种组合——同样大的余额,但收入低得多——提出了为什么这些借款人没有注册,为什么低收入借款人不太可能注册的问题. 一种可能性是IDR过程难以驾驭,或者相对于这些未登记借款人的预期收益而言成本过高(见, e.g., Pew 2022). 或者,这些借款人可能会对减少还款持谨慎态度,因为他们可能会为未来20年可能无法实现的承诺而在今天积累利息. 或者这些借款人可能只是想尽快还清债务,因为背负学生债务会增加其他信贷的成本, especially mortgages.
To shed light on these questions, 现在,我们将研究每个群体的借款人支付学生债务的负担程度,以及借款人管理这种负担的能力.
Finding Two: 有资格获得IDR但没有注册的借款人似乎可以跟上他们的学生贷款支付,但使用他们收入的很大一部分来这样做. Enrolling in IDR could decrease their short-term payment burden substantially.
图4显示了以美元为单位的每一组支付金额的分布,以及借款人收入的一小部分. Equal starting balances and equal loan terms should result in equal monthly payments, 这就是我们在比较没有资格获得IDR的借款人与有资格但没有注册的借款人的月付款时所看到的(左图). 不符合条件的借款人每月还款额中位数为160美元,而符合条件但未登记的借款人每月还款额中位数为180美元. At the same time, IDR borrowers naturally have much lower payments (median of $90) because IDR mechanically lowers monthly payments. For comparison, CFPB (2019) reports an average IDR monthly payment of $97; Delisle et al. (2022) reports a range of similar estimates.
When comparing payments as a fraction of income, IDR borrowers and ineligible borrowers pay roughly the same amount (2.7% versus 3.0%), despite the lower incomes of IDR borrowers. 这可以解释为IDR平衡了低收入参保者和高收入不合格借款人的财务负担(支付占收入的百分比).
At the same time, borrowers eligible for IDR but not enrolled pay much larger portions of their take-home income. Half of them spend more than 10 percent of their take-home pay on student debt payments, and a quarter pay roughly 15 percent or more. Note that while these are very high payment burdens, they should not be surprising since IDR eligibility hinges on whether your student debt payments are more than 10 percent of your discretionary income; anyone whose payments are a small fraction of their income are ineligible for IDR.12
图4:有印尼卢比的借款人与没有资格获得印尼卢比的高收入借款人支付的债务数额相似
How well are eligible but not enrolled borrowers able to keep up with these large payment burdens? Figure 5 shows the fraction of borrowers in each group who made all their payments during our sample year.13 The fraction of borrowers keeping up with their payments is approximately equal across all three groups. Most notably, all borrowers not enrolled in IDR, eligible or not, have similar proportions keeping up with their payments (86 percent versus 82 percent), despite the much higher payment burdens among those eligible for IDR.
Figure 5: Borrowers eligible for IDR but not enrolled are keeping up with their payments despite their lower incomes
这些借款人是如何在支付了他们税后收入的10%甚至15%的情况下保持还款的呢? It is possible that these lower-income borrowers sacrifice saving or other spending to keep up with their payments. It is also possible that they are keeping up with payments because they receive financial help from family, friends, and others, as discussed by Farrell, Greig, and Sullivan (2020). While spending behavior is beyond the scope of this report, we explore the extent of financial help received by each group in Figure 6.14
Figure 6 shows the distribution of net financial help received on student debt payments within each group.15 Median help received by eligible but not enrolled is only a few dollars a month, but the 75th percentile of net help is just under $125 per month. This means that for a substantial fraction of these borrowers, 他们每个月的大部分付款都是由其他人支付的(回顾图4,这些借款人的月付款中位数为180美元)。. This suggests that many borrowers who are eligible for IDR are reliant on others, likely family members, to keep up with payments.16
Figure 6: Borrowers eligible for IDR but not enrolled are much more likely to receive financial help to make payments
These borrowers’ reliance on help rather than IDR may be a conscious choice: By leveraging familial resources, they can clear their debt faster which may better serve their long-term financial plans. Alternatively, family assistance could be a strategy to manage the high repayment burden: in the absence of payment relief, a borrower’s only options may be to rely on family for help or to default on the debt. IDR eligible borrowers not receiving significant help, who are the bulk of this group, face similar tradeoffs. This again raises the question of why these borrowers have not enrolled in IDR, whether they have made an affirmative decision to avoid IDR or face administrative barriers to enrollment. 我们进一步探讨了这一点,估计未登记借款人可能从IDR获得的付款减免和债务减免的金额.
Finding Three: Of borrowers eligible for IDR but not enrolled, most would receive debt forgiveness under IDR. But those with relatively higher incomes receive no forgiveness and IDR is equivalent to a loan extension, lowering their monthly payments but increasing the total cost of their debt.
While it is unclear why borrowers who are eligible for IDR do not enroll, it is likely a combination of factors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that borrowers may be overwhelmed with the complexity of IDR plans. 实验证据表明,计划选择本身是昂贵的,借款人也可能高估了他们的收入轨迹,从而低估了IDR的有用程度(考克斯), Kreisman, and Dynarski 2020). That is, many borrowers are making a conscious choice not to enroll in IDR.
In this section, we explore the financial tradeoffs IDR eligible borrowers face when choosing to enroll.
Figure 7 shows hypothetical payment relief that eligible IDR borrowers would receive if they were to enroll. The median value is shown for each quintile of take-home income within the eligible for IDR group. The median relief among the lowest earners is roughly $102 per month, or 9 percent of take-home income. Among the highest earners, monthly relief is slightly higher ($152), but this constitutes a much smaller share of their take-home income (3.5 percent).
Figure 7: Payment relief from IDR could be substantial for those who are not enrolled
This potential payment relief is substantial, especially for the lowest income borrowers, and might provide an incentive to enroll in IDR. However, 现在降低月供在未来是有代价的,因为借款人将不得不背负更长时间的债务,并可能支付更多的利息.
这种情况的一个极端情况是,当借款人的印尼盾付款低于他们每月的利息费用,债务变成负摊销, meaning their balance would grow over time. While IDR enrollees are promised forgiveness of any remaining debt after 20 years, increasing balances may still worry borrowers for several reasons. First, 关于IDR管理不善和官僚主义的报道可能会破坏借款人对他们实际上会得到宽恕的信念.17 负摊销债务也意味着借款人将不得不在20年的信用报告中背负越来越大的债务, making other credit products like mortgages and car loans more difficult get and more expensive. In addition, if a borrower believes they will get a higher paying job in the future that would increase their IDR payment, they may have to pay back much of that accumulated interest.
Figure 8 shows how many borrowers in each income group would be negatively amortized if they were to enroll in IDR. A large majority of the lowest income borrowers would be negatively amortized, which is unsurprsing given many of them are below the cutoff for a $0 monthly payment. However, non-trivial shares of borrowers in all income groups would also be negatively amortized, including roughly a quarter of families earning more than $34,000 per year.
Figure 8: Share of potential IDR enrollees whose monthly IDR payments are less than their monthly interest charge
注册IDR的另一个潜在成本是,它将导致借款人通过延长贷款期限来支付更多的利息. 对于那些还款减免比较有限,并且将在不到20年的时间内还清贷款,因此无法获得债务减免的人来说,情况尤其如此. These borrowers will end up paying more interest on their loan compared to a standard repayment plan of 10 years.
图9显示了在IDR下,如果借款人注册并遵循其IDR付款计划,将获得减免的借款人比例. 然而,低收入借款人有望获得减免的比例很高——在收入最低的五分之一家庭中占91%,在收入第二低的家庭中占83%,实得收入超过23美元,000 are as likely to receive forgiveness as not (51 and 52 percent for the highest quintiles). This is a relatively low level of income, even for IDR enrollees; more 75 percent of current IDR enrollees in our sample make more than $23,000. Nevertheless, payment relief is not generous enough to result in forgiveness of debt for these borrowers, likely because they have a relatively small amount debt. 这也许可以解释为什么有些人不愿意使用印尼盾计价货币:许多借款人面临债务余额和收入驱动的付款金额,这使得印尼盾计价货币相对没有吸引力.
Figure 9: Half of IDR eligible borrowers with more than $23,000 in take-home income are unlikely to receive forgiveness through IDR
In summary, borrowers who are eligible for but not on IDR could receive payment relief of roughly $100 per month, freeing up more than 5 percent of their take-home income. Because their payments would be so low, 大多数借款人的贷款将负摊销,他们将获得贷款减免,只要他们保持印尼盾和良好的信誉. This should be an attractive tradeoff for many low-income borrowers, which raises the question of why they do not enroll. Possible reasons include (1) personal preference against debt—they would prefer to spend less now to pay down their debt more quickly; (2) they have other financial goals such as purchasing a home, and keeping student loan debt on their credit bureau record makes it hard or more expensive to obtain a mortgage; and (3) they would like payment relief but face administrative barriers to enrolling.
Finding Four: Changes to IDR may dramatically expand eligibility and reduce total out of pocket cost to current IDR enrollees.
In this section, 我们考虑了对IDR规则可能做出的一些假设变化,以及这些变化可能如何影响当前和潜在的IDR借款人. We consider three hypothetical changes to IDR which are summarized in Table 1:
- 10-year maximum term for borrowers with small debts: This change would give borrowers with small initial debts ($10,000 or less) forgiveness after 10 years of IDR participation instead of 20.
- Expanded Income Contingent Repayment (EICR). 18 EICR没有改变借款人必须参与多长时间才能获得减免,但它对本科生借款人每月还款的计算方式做了两项改变. First, it raises the discretionary income deduction from 150 percent of the federal poverty threshold to 200 percent. Second, instead of 10 percent of discretionary income, 借款人支付其可支配收入的5%,介于贫困线的200%至300%之间,然后支付收入超过300%的10%.
- 5% payment burden: 我们的第三个假设遵循拜登2020年总统竞选的提议,即将学生债务偿还所需的可自由支配收入从10%降低到5%.
Table 1: Summary of possible IDR rule changes
In examining the effects of these hypothetical changes, 我们首先计算有多少借款人有资格,因为每月支付较低的印尼盾也会使更多的借款人有资格获得印尼盾.
Figure 10 shows total eligibility under each hypothetical, including those in our sample flagged as already enrolled in IDR. Under current IDR rules, 31 percent of our sample is eligible.19 Our first hypothetical, which decreases the time required to receive forgiveness, does not decrease monthly payment amounts and so does not increase eligibility relative to current IDR rules. Under our other hypotheticals, 月供下降,结果是整体资格从我们样本的31%增加到47- 48%.
Figure 10: Making IDR more generous for current enrollees can also make more borrowers eligible
In addition to increased eligibility, lower monthly payments may also decrease the total amount of money people repay over the life of their loan. Recall that lowering monthly payments also extends the amount of time a person will take to repay their loan. 任何印尼盾的借款人,如果在20年之前还清他们的余额,可能会在贷款期限内支付更多. 我们同时考虑了这两种相反的力量(更低的月供,但更长的还款期限),通过观察贷款的总自付成本——所有本金和利息支付的总和——由借款人支付.20 Specifically, 我们将每组IDR规则下的贷款总成本与遵循标准还款时间表的总成本进行比较. For example, 100%的相对成本意味着借款人支付的本金和利息与他们没有注册印尼卢比时支付的本金和利息完全相同. 请注意,我们没有区分本金和利息支付,因为许多IDR参保人获得了豁免,因此支付是否全部是利息与总自付费用的计算无关. Because we only observe one year’s worth of payments, 我们估计每个借款人在我们的样本期之前支付了多少,并假设他们将继续支付当前的印尼盾付款,直到他们的贷款还清或支付20年的印尼盾付款.21
图11显示了表1中描述的IDR样本中每个收入五分位数的每个IDR项目的相对成本中值. 图11中第一个有趣的项目是,在所有收入五分位数中,IDR贷款与标准10年期还款计划的相对成本中位数大致相同, hovering between 88 and 95 percent. That is, 典型的印尼卢比计划的借款人将支付大约88- 95%的金额,如果他们继续使用标准的10年期还款计划,他们将支付. However, a large portion of low-income borrowers pays relatively little under IDR and these medians mask significant variation in the distribution of total costs; see appendix Figure C. Notably, 31 percent of borrowers on IDR will pay more on IDR than they would under the standard 10-year repayment schedule. These higher costs of loan repayment under IDR are potentially somewhat surprising. First, it should be remembered that borrowers can make significant payments before enrolling in IDR. Thus, even borrowers with an IDR payment of $0 may not have a relative cost of 0 percent.
将初始债务较低的借款人的还款窗口缩短至10年,大大降低了低收入借款人的总贷款成本, but only slightly for higher income borrowers. This is likely because high-income borrowers tend to have much higher debts (Farrell, Greig, and Sullivan 2020) and so are much less likely to qualify for the decreased payoff window. For these borrowers, the terms of IDR program are unchanged.
降低月还款额(用蓝色和红色表示的假设)对低收入借款人也有类似的效果,即大幅降低贷款总成本. But under these hypothetical policies, high-income borrowers also see a substantial decrease. This is because these programs affect all borrowers, regardless of income or balance. Based on the equations underlying EICR, 收入超过联邦门槛300%的借款人每月可减少约107美元的还款, assuming a household size of one. Under the 5 percent hypothetical, all borrowers see their monthly payments cut in half. However, the restriction of these more generous changes to undergraduate debt does prevent them from being more regressive, since graduate borrowers are more likely to have higher incomes.
Figure 11: Reducing monthly payments reduces out of pocket costs for all income groups
Finding Five: Implications
Our results suggest that IDR may be significantly under-subscribed. A number of measures have been proposed that would likely be very effective in boosting enrollment, such as making IDR the default repayment scheme, which lab experiments show could boost enrollment significantly (Cox, Kreisman, and Dynarski 2020). This is in line with other research in behavioral economics that finds choice architecture, especially default selections like automatic 401(k) enrollment, is very influential on the choices consumers make and on their financial welfare (see., e.g., Blumenstock, Callen, Ghani 2018). But framing of the default choice can also have significant effects on consumer welfare, often in counter-intuitive ways (Bernheim, Fradkin, and Popov 2015). We find that IDR is much more beneficial for some borrowers relative to others, and this nuance may inform how enrollment boosting policies are structured.
Enrolling in IDR can immediately provide relief through lower payments and possible forgiveness in the future, but it also has costs, 直接的(额外的利息支付)和间接的(由于长期背负学生债务而增加的其他信贷成本). Among current IDR enrollees, 31% will end up paying more under IDR than under a 10-year plan and lower-income borrowers are more likely to pay more under IDR relative to the standard plan.22 Among borrowers eligible for IDR but not enrolled, we find that almost all of those with less than $16,000 in take-home income will receive some amount of forgiveness at the end of their IDR term. But only half of those with more than $23,000 will receive any forgiveness, meaning they will pay more in interest relative to a standard 10-year plan.23 Field data also suggest that students are heavily swayed by the default choice, but many avoid IDR when IDR’s costs are brought to their attention (Abraham et al. 2020). These facts should be considered when weighing the decision of what the default payment plan should be.
A potentially lower risk strategy for increasing IDR enrollment is to reduce the paperwork burden. In a randomized experiment with actual student debtors, Mueller and Yanellis (2019) found that reducing paperwork burden could potentially double IDR enrollment.
Policymakers could also make IDR more financially attractive 通过降低特定收入水平的要求付款或减少获得宽恕所需付款的次数. This would likely induce more people to enroll in IDR, but it would also change the scenario for current IDR enrollees. Given the low IDR take-up rate under current rules, 对现有参保者的总体影响可能远大于那些被吸引新参保的借款人.
Independent of efforts to increase IDR enrollment, proposed changes to IDR itself should be thoroughly vetted. Our results suggest changes to IDR parameters—income deduction amounts, marginal payment amounts, repayment horizons—can have surprisingly large effects on who is eligible, how much current enrollees ultimately pay out of pocket, and how long borrowers carry their debt. Which parameters are changed can also affect the relative progressivity of the changes, and all of these facets should be weighed carefully.
Data and IDR tagging
Our data consist of 116,在2015年12月至2016年11月期间,与我们匹配Experian信用局数据的868名大通支票账户客户.
The credit bureau data do not include any information on whether a student debt account is enrolled in IDR. We flag borrowers as being in IDR in the following way. We first calculate each loan’s amortization schedule using the loan’s opening balance, the loan’s term in months, 贷款的估算利率是根据余额的逐月变化与报告的付款进行比较(见 Farrell, Greig, and Sullivan 2020). From the calculated amortization schedule, we can see what monthly payments would be in the absence of IDR. We then compare the predicted monthly payment to the actual required minimum payment recorded by the credit bureau. If the actual scheduled monthly payment is at least 30 percent less than the predicted monthly payment, we flag that loan as being enrolled in IDR. When determining whether a borrower, rather than an individual loan, is enrolled in IDR, we require at least half of their loans to be flagged as “IDR”, 剩下的在预测月供和实际月供之间至少有10%的差异. Any borrowers with both IDR and non-IDR loans are dropped from the sample. 这些将我们的样本划分为两个相互排斥的组:我们预测的那些参加了IDR,而那些没有. 我们也从整个样本中删除任何借款人的贷款被信用局标记为延期或宽容在我们的样本期间的任何时间点.
Next, we predict whether a borrower who is not enrolled in IDR might be eligible to enroll. To do this, 我们将借款人的年度实得收入计算为除跨账户转账外所有存款的总和.e., transfers into a checking account from a savings account). Note that this is a measure of income after taxes and other withholdings, while IDR eligibility depends on annual gross income (AGI). We assume a tax withholding rate of 22 percent to inflate our measure of take-home income to gross income. Next, 我们在标准印尼盾支付计算中使用这一总收入衡量标准来确定借款人在印尼盾下的最高每月支付额. For the federal poverty threshold, we use the 2016 value for a one-person household of $11,880. 我们将所有计划最低还款额大于预测印尼盾还款额的借款人标记为有资格获得印尼盾还款额.
One important caveat to note about our approach is the difference between personal and household income. The borrowers we consider are the primary account holders for the accounts in our data. However, there may be other account holders who also deposit money into the account, such as a spouse. Thus, our income measure is likely closer to household income than personal income. 但是,如果借款人未婚或与配偶分开报税,那么IDR资格可以由个人收入决定. As household income is weakly greater than personal income, this would cause us to underestimate the number of people eligible for IDR.
Because the bank accounts we observe may not be the only financial accounts used by the borrower, 我们还将样本限制在使用某些标准的账户中,以增加这些大通银行账户是他们进行大部分金融业务的主要支票账户的可能性, especially their income deposits. First, we require accounts to have at least five transactions (inflows or outflows) in every month in our sample period. Second, we require accounts to have at least $12,000 in income during the sample year. We require this minimum amount of income because, based on validation in previous research, 在我们的数据中,收入极低的账户更有可能是实际收入较高的家庭的次要账户. Third, to further remove these secondary accounts, 我们将我们的收入测量值与信用局数据中包含的总收入估计值进行比较,如果信用局收入比我们的实得收入测量值高出四倍以上,则放弃该帐户.
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Figure C
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Farrell, Diana, Fiona Greig, and Daniel M. Sullivan. 2020. “Student Loan Debt: Who is Paying it Down?” JPMorgan Chase Institute. http://q2.r3dpill.com/corporate/institute/household-debt-student-loan-debt.
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Wessel, David, and Persis Yu. 2022. “Income-Driven Repayment of Student Loans: Problems and Options for Addressing Them.” Report, Hutchens Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at Brookings. http://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/IDR-student-loan-report.pdf
We thank Sarah Kuehl, Clarke Wilson, Stephen Harrington, Kristine Pham, Annabel Jouard, Robert Caldwell, and Anthony Rivera for their support. We are indebted to our internal partners and colleagues, who support delivery of our agenda in a myriad of ways and acknowledge their contributions to each and all releases.
We are also grateful for the invaluable constructive feedback we received from external experts and partners. We are deeply grateful for their generosity of time, insight, and support. This research was possible because of the vital partnership, data, and knowledge from Experian.
We would like to acknowledge Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase & Co., for his vision and leadership in establishing the Institute and enabling the ongoing research agenda. We remain deeply grateful to Peter Scher, Vice Chairman, Demetrios Marantis, Head of Corporate Responsibility, Heather Higginbottom, Head of Research & Policy, 以及公司其他员工的资源和支持,以开创一种新的方法,为全球经济分析和洞察力做出贡献.
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Greig, Fiona, Daniel M Sullivan, Bernard Ho. 2022. “Income Driven Repayment: Who needs student loan payment relief?” JPMorgan Chase Institute. http://q2.r3dpill.com/institute/research/household-debt/student-loan-income-driven-repayment